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Tim Maudlin’s Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time is the first of a two-volume survey of key 
foundational issues in the philosophy of physics. The two volumes concern the two historically dis-
tinct subject matters of physics: space and time; and their material contents. The present volume is 
an accessible and highly engaging introduction to the major issues in the physics of space and time 
that guides the reader through the philosophical foundations of physical geometry, the special and 
general theories of relativity, and the topology of time, and is suitable both for the philosopher with 
minimal physics background and for the physicist interested in the main historical philosophical 
issues concerning spacetime theories.  
 The central theme of Maudlin’s presentation of the history of spacetime is a focus on 
geometrical rather than arithmetical methods. The absence of equations from the presentation of the 
Newtonian laws of motion is due not to a fear of putting off the lay reader, but rather to the conviction 
that the arithmetization of physics is unnecessary and misleading. Aside from the fact that Newton 
himself used geometry rather than arithmetic to present his theory, Maudlin emphasizes that ‘[t]o put 
it bluntly, the physical world is not composed of numbers or of entities for which the standard arith-
metic operations are defined’. Rather, ‘[t]he physical world contains physical magnitudes that have 
a geometrical structure’ and hence ‘[g]eometry is more directly connected to the physical world than 
is arithmetic’ (25, emphases in original). This focus on the geometrical rather than algebraic presen-
tation of theories reflects a major theme in Maudlin’s wider work in the philosophy of physics, the 
idea that the geometrical structure of a theory is a guide to the theory’s ontology–what the theory 
says about the structure of the world. For instance, Maudlin informs the reader that it is crucial to 
understand Newtonian space in terms of E3–a Euclidean three space of points–rather than in terms of 
ℝ3–a triple of real numbers. The reason for this is that it is the former and not the latter that reflects 
the proper ontological commitments of Newtonian mechanics. Of course, using the algebraic repre-
sentation of Newtonian spacetime is particularly useful in terms of solving equations, performing 
calculations, etc., but one should not consult the algebraic formulation as a guide to the theory’s 
ontology. What Newtonian mechanics says about the world is encoded in the theory’s geometrical 
structure.  
 The preference for geometric rather than algebraic presentations of physics focuses on one 
chief culprit: the coordinate system. Maudlin notes the standard textbook presentations of classical 
mechanics as centrally involving coordinate systems, origins, frames of reference and other such 
terms absent from Newton’s own presentation (‘Newton makes no mention of an “origin”’; 
‘[Newton] would have had no idea what a “frame of reference” was’ [both 31, emphasis in original]). 
The misleading nature of coordinate-dependent representations is most acute in the context of rela-
tivity theory (Chapters 4-6), Maudlin’s transparent and engaging discussion of which being the 
book’s highlight. As with Newtonian mechanics, the special theory of relativity (SR) is presented 
geometrically and, accordingly, traditional philosophical problems arising from the theory are taken 
to be aspects of the algebraic approach: ‘[SR] is a very simple theory that is commonly presented in 
a complex and confusing way’ (67). Due to this, the presentations of special and general relativity 
(GR) do not follow the historical approach of Chapters 1-3. Instead, Maudlin uses a (geometrical) 
principle-based derivation of the key features of relativistic physics, bypassing a discussion of the 
pre-Einsteinian development of relativity theory. 
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 At the heart of SR is the light postulate–labelled by Einstein as the ‘principle of the constancy 
of the velocity of light’. Maudlin notes that the inclusion of terms such as ‘velocity’ at the conceptual 
heart of the theory is an unfortunate and misleading throwback to Newtonian absolute space and time 
–‘[t]o understand Relativity, we have to expunge all ideas of things having speeds, including light’ 
(68). Rather than grounding SR on the constancy of the speed of light (which Maudlin deems 
‘physically very complicated’ [69]), Maudlin takes the heart of the theory to be the lightcone struc-
ture–i.e., the geometry of Minkowski spacetime. As such, Maudlin uses geometrical principles (the 
‘Law of Light’, ‘Relativistic Law of Inertia’ and ‘Clock Hypothesis’) in place of Einstein’s princi-
ples. This makes for a helpful presentation of SR, including a particularly lucid analysis of the twin 
paradox (76-83). Here, the heuristic value of the geometrical explanation of relativistic effects is 
emphasized by contrasting Maudlin’s geometrical account of the ‘paradox’ with a famous account 
given in Richard Feynman's Lectures on Physics; Maudlin notes (polemically though persuasively) 
of Feynman’s account that ‘everything in this “explanation” is wrong’ (81). The discussion of rela-
tivity culminates in a detailed exploration of the status of spacetime substantivism in the context of 
GR (Chapter 6), with a useful survey of philosophical treatments of the hole argument.  
 The book takes a marked turn in style in the final chapter, ‘The Direction and Topology of 
Time’, in which Maudlin declares ‘we are all inevitably headed toward the grave and away from the 
nursery’ (166). Although as seemingly obvious as it is bleak, Maudlin’s strong form of realism about 
the direction of time is hardly read off the physics. To point to the relevant background: although 
weak interactions in particle physics have been shown experimentally to violate time-reversal sym-
metry (modulo some assumptions that need not worry us here), this in no way distinguishes the two 
time directions in such a way as to support one being the direction in which processes unfold nor 
motivate realism about an asymmetric ‘causal production’ relation. We are still left with a key time 
symmetry—the physics can be taken to govern interactions in either time direction—and so it is 
superfluous to talk of the ‘direction’ of processes, or whether the universe is ‘really’ expanding or 
contracting, just as coordinate-dependent terms in the context of relativity theory are superfluous. 
Indeed, just as Maudlin takes the use of terms vestigially attached to coordinate systems (e.g., 
velocity) to be both parochial and an impediment to understanding the invariant commitments of 
relativity theory, so too is the use of time-directed terms in the context of physics that requires no 
distinction between ‘earlier’ and ‘later’. It is natural, for instance, to understand a Newtonian system 
to be determined by ‘initial’ (as opposed to ‘final’) conditions and a (‘future’-directed) dynamical 
law, but Newtonian physics does not require this.  
 Nonetheless, Maudlin’s account of time direction involves a commitment to a fundamental 
directionality of causation: ‘there is […] a fundamental direction of time, in virtue of which it is 
correct to say that the universe is expanding and new matter being created, rather than contracting 
with matter being destroyed’ (166). (Maudlin has elaborated on his particular take on time’s direc-
tionality elsewhere [Maudlin, T. The Metaphysics within Physics, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Chapter 4].) Though it may appear quite harmless to attach such a background metaphysic of the 
passage of time to the physical description of the world, Maudlin takes his realism about time direc-
tion to place specific restrictions upon physical explanation, in particular ruling out as unphysical (a) 
spacetimes containing closed timelike curves (CTCs: worldlines that allow an object to time-travel 
to its own local past) and (b) temporally non-orientable spacetimes (spacetimes in which there exists 
no globally consistent division of lightcones into future and past lobes). There is a clear tension 
between this line of reasoning and the geometrical approach to relativity endorsed in earlier chapters.  
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For instance, Maudlin prescribes the rejection of CTC-containing spacetimes as unphysical in order 
to preserve the distinction between earlier and later. This line of reasoning is incongruous to that 
employed in his argument (126) that the existence of vacuum solutions of GR show that spacetime 
geometry is not determined by matter distribution. Were one to similarly take vacuum solutions, like 
CTC solutions, to be unphysical, one could maintain the dependence of spacetime geometry upon 
matter distribution. Just as Maudlin makes the case that classical and relativistic physics needs to be 
freed from coordinate-dependent presentations (e.g., ‘modern physics has become so thoroughly 
arithmetized […] that we cannot readily recognize Newton’s original theory in a modern presenta-
tion’ [31]), one is tempted to read Maudlin’s claim that ‘the direction of time is embedded so deeply 
into our language and concepts that it is impossible to expunge ’ (166) as a further challenge for a 
time-direction-neutral presentation of textbook physics. Maudlin does not view this as a challenge 
worth taking. 
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